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Combining insights from the behavioral theory of the firm and the resource-based view we 
investigate the antecedents of strategic change in fast-changing environments. We hypothesize 
the independent and joint effects of performance feedback and of  flexible and specific resources 
on strategic change. Using an unbalanced panel of 493 publisher-year observations we find that 
negative performance feedback triggers more strategic change. Further, while flexible resources 
have no direct influence on strategic change they weaken the negative relationship between 
performance feedback and strategic change. Finally, we find that larger stocks of specific 
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PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK, FIRM RESOURCES, AND STRATEGIC CHANGE 
 
Academics and practitioners in management have long been interested in 
strategic change. The demise of established firms has been attributed to their inability to 
adapt business models to changing environmental demands. Engaging in strategic 
change – adapting the ways in which firms create and appropriate value – can therefore 
secure the future profitability and viability of organizations. Even so, strategic change is 
inherently risky and may result in firms losing their competitive advantage without 
significant gains for future competitiveness. A substantial body of academic work has 
therefore looked into the antecedents, occurrences, and performance implications of 
strategic change. 
Two strands of literature have emerged as the most active research streams on 
strategic change. The behavioral theory of the firm highlights the importance of 
performance feedback and the availability of slack resources for understanding strategic 
change (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003; Miller & Chen, 2004; Singh, 1986). The key 
conjecture is that positive performance feedback reinforces commitments to prior 
strategic initiatives while negative feedback triggers strategic changes (Bromiley, 1991; 
March, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987). The availability of slack resources for 
experimentation facilitates adaptation independent of performance feedback (George, 
2005; Greve, 2007; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). The resource-based view of strategy sees a 
firm’s resource base as a primary driver of strategic change (Gilbert, 2005; Kraatz & 
Zajac, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The intuition is that the current resource 
base shapes the menu of strategic options available to a firm. The resource base can 
be both an enabler and a constraint to strategic change. Yet, what appears less well 
understood is how performance feedback and the resource base of firms jointly and 
interdependently influence the propensity to engage in risky strategic changes. We 
therefore ask the following questions: Does the availability of flexible resources make 
firms more sensitive to feedback and thereby promote strategic changes? How do prior, 
specific resource commitments affect the propensity to engage in strategic change? 2 
 
To address these questions, we combine insights from the behavioral theory of 
the firm with considerations from the resource-based view. Following extant research on 
organizational risk taking, we propose that negative feedback triggers more substantial 
changes in strategic actions. The resource base of a firm has an important influence on 
the link between performance feedback and strategic change. We distinguish two broad 
classes of firm resources that play a primary role in strategic decision-making, flexible 
and specific resources (Caves, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 
1988; Teece et al., 1997). Flexible resources can be easily (re)allocated across 
strategic options, while specific resources result from prior resource commitments and 
are specialized toward particular strategic actions. We argue that flexible resources 
such as unabsorbed slack or industry competence make firms less sensitive to 
performance feedback. Firms with larger stocks of flexible resources have a lower 
propensity to initiate changes in response to negative feedback, while they adapt 
strategy more rapidly when feedback is positive. Prior resource commitments to specific 
strategic options reduce the propensity to change. That is, independent of performance 
feedback, firms with more specific resources initiate fewer strategic changes, 
highlighting the path-dependent nature of strategic behavior. Thus, the causal 
mechanism linking feedback to strategic change differs for flexible and specific 
resources.  
We test our hypotheses on a panel of video game publishers. The dynamic 
nature of the video gaming industry is a useful testing ground for our theory since firms 
constantly engage in strategic change. We use change in the product portfolios of 
publishers as our dependent variable since product releases are genuinely strategic and 
the development of video games requires substantial resource commitments. Strategic 
change can then be measured as the rate of change in the product portfolio of a firm 
over time. Our main independent variables are performance feedback and the stocks of 
flexible and specific resources. Controlling for a range of portfolio-, firm and industry-
specific conditions, we find most of our hypotheses supported.  
The significance of our work is threefold. First, we add to work on the behavioral 
theory of the firm by elaborating on the effect of firm resources on organizational 
adaptation (Argote & Greve, 2007; Audia & Greve, 2006). Importantly, flexible resources 3 
 
may be useful to shield firms from negative feedback, granting stability advantages to a 
firm. These advantages are especially valuable in turbulent environments where short-
term performance feedback is often misleading. Second, we contribute to the resource-
based view of strategy. Prior resource commitments, the availability of flexible 
resources, and performance feedback combine to shape how firms create, evaluate, 
and choose among strategic paths (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece et al., 1997).  Third, 
our results also shed light on strategic decision-making in fast-changing environments 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Prior research on time-paced competition suggests that 
firms navigate those business settings by creating and maintaining temporal links in 
product portfolios. Flexible resources help firms maintain these links even in the face of 
negative performance feedback.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop the theoretical 
body of our work and develop a set of hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce our 
empirical context and describe our sample, measures and the estimation method. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 discusses how our research contributes to 
prior work. Section 6 concludes. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Fast-moving markets pose ongoing challenges for firms. Entry of new 
competitors and customers and rapidly evolving technologies combine to create 
constant pressure for strategic change to stay competitive. In recent years the notion of 
proactive adaptation has gained currency as an appropriate organizational response 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). The 
proposition is that organizations need the ability and willingness to initiate intentional 
strategic adjustments in resource deployment and investment strategies. Put differently, 
firms must change before competitive advantages are eroded.  
Yet, initiating strategic change is also risky, since the changes could destroy the 
sources of profitability without gains for future competitiveness (Ghemawat & Costa, 
1993; Greve, 2003; March, 1991). The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that a 
firm’s willingness to engage in risky strategic change primarily depends on performance 4 
 
feedback (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Levinthal & March, 
1981). Positive feedback signals the success of a current strategy and firms will be 
reluctant to change current strategy and experiment with risky options. Negative 
feedback suggests a failing strategy and thereby motivates experimentation and 
strategic adjustments in resource deployment and investment strategies (Audia, Locke, 
& Smith, 2000; Lant, 1992; Miller & Chen, 2004). Prior work found strong support for 
this relationship between performance feedback and organizational change in 
manufacturing (Bromiley, 1991), radio broadcasting (Greve, 1998), financial services 
(Mezias, Chen, & Murphy, 2002), shipbuilding (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2007), and 
railway operations (Desai, 2010) among others. Our baseline hypothesis therefore is: 
Hypothesis 1: Negative performance feedback leads to more strategic change. 
Research on performance feedback and strategic change in the behavioral 
tradition highlights contextual factors that affect organizational decision-making (Audia & 
Greve, 2006; Argote & Greve, 2007). Older firms respond less to performance 
feedback, suggesting that they are more inert in decision-making and risk-taking (Audia 
& Greve, 2006). Firms threatened with bankruptcy focus on survival and lower risk-
taking in response to negative feedback (March & Shapira, 1992; Miller & Chen, 2004; 
Audia & Greve, 2006). A large body of work studies the role of slack resources for 
organizational change, as these are available for experimentation and the exploration of 
new opportunities (Greve, 2007; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 
2008). Extant studies found a strong effect of slack resources on organizational 
innovativeness (Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Geiger & Cashen, 2002; Greve, 2008).  
Yet, while prior work showed that organizational factors such as firm age, 
resource endowments, and threat perception influence a firm’s proclivity to change, less 
is known about how the characteristics of a firm’s resource base affects their 
responsiveness to performance feedback and strategic change. The main tenet of the 
resource-based view is that resource characteristics influence the strategic options 
available to a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece et al., 1997). For 
example, Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) show how the heterogeneity of internal 
resources affects diversification strategies. Flexible resources allow firms to explore 5 
 
distant market opportunities and to diversify widely. The literature on strategic change 
also points to the resource base of a firm as a primary source of organizational inertia 
(Colombo & Delmastro, 2002; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001) and adaptability (Nohria & Gulati, 
1996; Voss et al., 2008). However, a limitation of these studies is that they do not 
consider performance feedback or study the differential impact of different resource 
classes.  
In our research, we draw on an important categorization of resources in the 
strategy literature, namely the distinction between flexible and specific resources 
(Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1989; Ghemawat, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1992). The 
distinction aims at the plasticity of resources and their potential for (re-)deployment. 
Flexible resources are both tangible and intangible assets that may be easily 
redeployed since they retain their value across alternative strategic options (Sanchez, 
1995; Nakadarni & Narayanan, 2007). For example, internal financial resources 
(Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991), managerial competence (Penrose, 1959), or alliance 
experience (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) are highly flexible as they can be allocated 
across a wide range of options. In contrast, specific resources are relevant to particular 
strategies, resulting from irreversible investments and commit firms to specific strategic 
options, since their re-deployment is often impossible without a sharp reduction in 
resource value (Caves, 1994; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Lippman & Rumelt, 1992; 
Ghemawat, 1991). Specific resources often secure sustainable competitive advantage 
(Ghemawat, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Peteraf, 1993). The question we explore is 
how stocks of flexible and specific resources affect how firms process performance 
feedback and engage in strategic change.  
Intuitively, flexible resources may have a direct impact on a firm’s proclivity to 
change strategies. Regardless of performance feedback, larger stocks of flexible 
resources allow firms to seize more strategic options and proactively adapt to a 
changing environment (Aaker & Mascarenhas, 1993; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007; 
Teece, 2007). In contrast, smaller stocks of flexible resources may limit the ability of 
firms to implement intentional strategic changes. We therefore expect a direct effect of 
flexible resources on strategic change: 6 
 
H2: Firms with larger stocks of flexible resources engage in more strategic 
change. 
However, the relationship between flexible resources and strategic change may 
be even more subtle. The stock of flexible resources influences the ability, but not 
necessarily the willingness to implement strategic change. We posit that flexible 
resources influence how firms process and act upon performance feedback. Put 
differently, flexible resources are an important moderator of performance signals and 
strategic change, making firms less responsive to feedback. Flexible resources only 
promote intentional strategic change if performance feedback is positive, while they 
make firms less prone to change if feedback is negative. 
Behavioral and organizational factors might keep a firm with large stocks of 
flexible resources from being responsive to negative performance feedback, especially 
if the environment is characterized by ambiguous feedback. If that happens, firms may 
find it difficult to disentangle the causes of success and failure and make inferences 
from performance feedback (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 2010). Adner and 
Levinthal (2004) argue that flexibility stems from a willingness to abandon prior strategic 
investments and to reallocate flexible resources to new options. If feedback is 
ambiguous decision-makers might believe that further investments can improve the 
value of prior investments. For example, negative customer feedback in product 
development might be perceived as calling for further development efforts rather than a 
signal to abandon the project. Ambiguous feedback may thus lead firms into investment 
traps hindering the abandonment of existing options. This tendency to reinforce failure 
is also stressed in work on escalating commitments (Brockner, 1992; Starbuck, Barnett, 
& Baumard, 2008; Staw, 1981). Firms with ample flexible resources are especially 
prone to reinforcing potential failure as it buffers them from environmental pressures 
and lets them avoid difficult managerial choices.  
These papers point to a firm’s failure to interpret environmental signals as 
actionable feedback. However, not responding to negative feedback and staying on 
course can also be effective in turbulent, fast-moving environments (Kim & Rhee, 2009; 
Levinthal & Posen, 2011; Stieglitz, Knudsen, & Becker, 2009). These environments are 7 
 
often characterized by fleeting opportunities rather than stable trends (Bettis & Hitt, 
1995; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). There, performance feedback might be ambiguous 
since performance changes could be temporary. An appropriate organizational 
response in such settings could be to pursue stability in strategic actions and eschew 
the flexibility advantages in resource allocation. Otherwise, firms may abandon 
attractive long-term options too early while chasing short-lived opportunities. Larger 
stocks of flexible resources can confer stability advantages, allowing firms to persevere 
and to hold on to valuable options even in the face of temporary setbacks.  
In sum, we expect firms with larger stocks of flexible resources to engage in less 
change when performance feedback is negative. By contrast, with positive feedback the 
ability to change combines with a willingness to allocate flexible resources to new 
strategic options. This is because success promotes (over-)confidence (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999; March, 2010; Simon & Houghton, 2003). Firms with abundant flexible 
resources receiving positive feedback will not simply stick to their strategy but use their 
resources to experiment. The overall effect then is to make firms with larger stocks of 
flexible resources less responsive to performance feedback. 
H3: Larger stocks of flexible resources weaken the negative relationship between 
performance feedback and strategic change. 
Specific resources stem from irreversible investments into specialized tangible or 
intangible assets and competencies (Ghemawat, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1992; 
Williamson, 1999) and may create competitive advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Ghemawat, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), but also commit firms to strategic options since they 
cannot be redeployed without losses in resource value (Adner & Levinthal, 2004; 
Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Dixit, 1989). The critical question then is how past resource 
commitments influence future resource deployment and investment strategies. We 
expect a direct effect of the stock of specific resources on the general proclivity to 
change. The intuition is that abandoning a specific resource locks the firm out of an 
option (Dixit, 1989; Lippman & Rumelt, 1992). Re-entering in the future would imply 
incurring irreversible investment costs again. This is especially relevant if feedback is 
ambiguous and it is unclear if negative feedback signals a temporary setback or a 8 
 
pronounced preference shift. The more ambiguous the feedback, the stronger the 
evidence needed to trigger a disinvestment of a specific resource and investment in a 
new one (Dixit, 1989). Firms with larger stocks of specific resources therefore exhibit 
stronger path-dependency in strategic behavior and have lower proclivity to change, 
regardless of performance feedback.  
H4: Firms with larger stocks of specific resources engage in less strategic 
change. 
Error! Reference source not found. summarizes our theoretical framework and 
gives a stylized representation of the expected effects of our main independent 
variables on the relationship between performance feedback and strategic change. Our 
hypotheses are all contained in Error! Reference source not found.: Firms respond to 
negative performance feedback by engaging in more strategic change (H1), firms with 
larger stocks of flexible resources engage in more strategic change (H2), firms with 
larger stocks of flexible resources become less sensitive to performance feedback (H3), 
and firms with larger stocks of specific resources engage in less strategic change (H4). 
   9 
 
Figure 1 




DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Setting 
Our empirical setting is the global video game industry. In the last 30 years the 
electronic game industry has become the most important segment of the entertainment 
industry. In 2009, total hard- and software sales reached $19.66 billion in the US, of 
which $10.5 billion were generated by software sales (NPD, 2010). In comparison, 
movie box office revenues were $10.6 billion in the same year in the US and Canada 
together (MPAA, 2010).  

























The video game industry consists of three types of players: Platform providers, 
game publishers, and game developers. Platform providers (such as Nintendo or Sony) 
design and manufacture video game hardware and charge licensing fees to game 
publishers. Publishers (such as Electronic Arts or Activision) manage relationships with 
software retailers and platform providers, and package and market the game to 
consumers. Importantly, they also fund and control the game development process. 
Game developers (such as Rockstar Toronto or Lucasarts) create and code the video 
games. Game developers may be in-house studios owned by publishers or 
independent, external companies. Although game developers make most decisions 
regarding game development, publishers are highly involved in the process. They bear 
most of the financial risk of the development process and have to ensure that a 
development project remains on time and budget whilst meeting expected product 
quality (Chandler, 2009). 
We focus on game publishers and their product market decisions. Publishing a 
game involves considerable resource commitments through substantial marketing and 
development costs. Average development costs have soared during the last decade 
and amount to several million US dollars. A recent study by entertainment analyst group 
M2 Research puts development costs for single-platform projects at an average of $10 
million (Crossley, 2010). At the same time, various industry factors contribute to the 
financial risk of releasing a video game and recouping investment costs.  
First, the video game industry is hit- or blockbuster driven (Tschang, 2007). While 
many new games are introduced every month, a relatively small number of games 
(blockbusters) account for the majority of total sales. In 2009, the bestselling game “Wii 
Sports” sold more than 10.5 million units in the US alone, whereas the game ranked 
second, “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2” for the Xbox 360, sold only 58% of this and 
the game ranked twentieth “UFC 2009 Undisputed” for the Xbox 360 sold a mere 4% of 
this (VGChartz, 2011). As publishers know only some of their projects will pay off, they 
build up game portfolios to spread the risk: “We believe the diversification of our product 
mix will reduce our operating risks and increase our revenue” (TakeTwo, 2008). To 
increase the likelihood of releasing a hit a publisher focuses on sequels or licensed 
intellectual property from movies, books, sports leagues or players’ associations. 11 
 
However, due to the intense competition for licenses, the royalties paid to licensors are 
high (Edge, 2005), which increases the pressure for the game to be successful. 
Second, the product life cycle of a video game is relatively short, with 80% of 
game revenues made in the first 12 months after release (Dezsö, Grohsjean, & 
Kretschmer, 2010). This puts pressure on game publishers to ensure a constant stream 
of new releases. At the same time, predicting costumer reception and product success 
is difficult (De Vany, 2004), not least because of fast-changing consumer demands. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the top five genres and their annual 
market shares in the US between 2005 and 2009.  
Table 1 
Top 5 Genres regarding Market Shares in the US between 2005 and 2009 (Source: 
NPD Market Research) 






















































































Games classified as “Jump ‘n’ Run” are the second top selling games in 2005 but 
constantly lost market shares in the subsequent years and even disappeared from the 
list in 2008. On the other hand, “Music/Dance” games did not make the list until 2007 
when they reached top position and even increased their market share in 2008. While 
some genres like “Action” or “Role Playing” are constantly among the top five, other 12 
 
genres like “Football” or “Fitness” were among the top five only once. Clearly then, 
predicting the success of different genres and their games is challenging, but obviously 
important: “With target audiences and video game consumption constantly evolving, it is 
essential for a publisher to correctly anticipate market trends and to choose the proper 
format for a game. This strategic choice is crucial, given the sums invested.” (Ubisoft, 
2009).  
The issue of rapidly shifting consumer demand is reinforced by technological 
progress and opportunities. Every four to six years a new generation of video game 
consoles consisting of three to five different platforms is introduced. Publishers have to 
predict which console will be successful and which genre matches best with a given 
platform as consoles differ not only in their technological specifications but also target 
groups. While the most successful games on Nintendo’s Wii are sports games, the 
bestselling games on Sony’s Playstation 3 are mostly action and 1
st person shooter 
games (VGChartz, 2011).  
Lastly, publishers face a constantly changing roster of competitors, with high 





Number of Market Entries and Exits of Publishers between 1975 and 2005 
 
 
Data and Sample 
We use two different sources to construct our dataset: the MobyGames and 
Osiris databases. MobyGames is the world’s largest and most detailed video game 
documentation project, containing comprehensive information on more than 53,000 
games published since 1972. All information is entered by users of the site on a 
voluntary basis. To ensure accuracy, MobyGames has a strict set of coding instructions 
and requires all entries to be peer-reviewed prior to publication. For all game releases 
we retrieved data on genre, release date, intellectual property (IP), and publisher. We 
use MobyGames to build our dependent variable portfolio change, the independent 
variables industry experience and  share of games based on IP, and the control 
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This data is matched with the April 2010 online version of the Osiris database by 
Bureau van Dijk, which provides company balance sheets and income statements. 
Osiris has information on over 45,000 companies from over 140 countries. As well as 
descriptive information and the company financials, Osiris contains information on 
ownership structures and M&A activities, helping us match information on product 
releases with financial data. The level of detail depends on how demanding the 
accounting standards of a country are and which firms indeed report. Therefore, our 
sample is biased toward countries with more demanding accounting standards and 
more transparent firms. 50% of all firms in our sample are located in Europe, 20% in the 
United States and 30% in Japan. Osiris provides information on active and dissolved 
firms, limiting survivor bias. In fact, 8 out of 69 publishers (11%) went bankrupt during 
our observation period. We use Osiris to construct our two measures on performance 
feedback and the variables unabsorbed slack and firm size. Combining both datasets 
yields an unbalanced panel with 493 publisher-year observations of 69 different 
publishers between 1990 and 2009 for our analysis. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable. As we are interested in the link between performance 
feedback and strategic change, our dependent variable must capture the scope of 
strategic change in a meaningful way. We disregard changes in the corporate strategy 
of firms (i.e. M&A activities, diversification into other industries etc.) and focus instead 
on changes in the business strategy of a firm. Business strategy is concerned with 
competitive positions and advantages in a given industry (Porter, 1980, Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991) and manifests itself in resource commitments to 
competitive positions in an industry (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Ghemawat, 1991). Since 
game releases involve substantial resource commitments in terms of development, 
marketing, and managerial costs, we use the pattern of game releases by a publisher 
over time as a dependent variable to measure changes in business strategy.  15 
 
Our dependent variable portfolio change measures the change in the 
composition of a publisher’s portfolio of newly released games in a given year 
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,      (1) 
where gt,n denotes the number of games released in a market niche n at time t. nt 
(respectively nt,new) is the number of active market niches (respectively new market 
niches) at time t. A market niche in the video game industry is the genre of a game. 
Each genre represents a distinct product in terms of story, game design, level design, 
art and sound. Further, each genre requires a different set of skills and capabilities of 
the developer and the publisher as they appeal to distinct consumer groups with 
different preferences. Each game is classified into one or more genres. We rely on the 
classification by MobyGames into eight different basic genres: action, adventure, role 
playing game, strategy, sports, simulation, racing and educational. The first term in our 
measure captures the actual number of all changes in all genres in relation to all 
possible changes in all genres. The right hand side is a weight that takes a minimum 
value of one if the publisher does not enter a new genre in a certain year and values 
above 1 if the publisher does so. The weight captures the idea that entering a new niche 
is riskier than just moving games across existing niches since entering a new niche 
often requires the acquisition of new genre-specific capabilities. The composite variable 
portfolio change ranges between 0 and 2. While a value of 0 indicates no change at all, 
a value of 2 means a complete overhaul of the portfolio. A numerical example of our 
measure is given in Appendix A. 
We build this variable to measure how risky the product portfolio change of the 
publisher is and the extent of shifts in resource commitments. A publisher who makes 
more substantial changes in the release portfolio is exposed to higher financial risks. To 
illustrate this, we split our sample by the mean of portfolio change. As shown in Error! 
Reference source not found. we find that the mean of the return on assets is -.036 for 
high change and -.005 for low change. A t-test reveals that the difference between the 
means is not significant, indicating that low and high portfolio change lead to the same 16 
 
return on assets on average. However, the standard deviation of the return on assets 
increases from .255 for low portfolio change to .361 for high portfolio change. Using 
Levene’s robust tests for equality of variances we find that the variances are 
significantly different from each other. This indicates that although low and high portfolio 
change lead to the same average performance, they differ in terms of risk as the 
variance of high portfolio change is significantly higher than the variance of low portfolio 
change. 
Figure 3 
Distribution of Return on Assets depending on the Level of Portfolio Change 
 
Independent variables. A central tenet of the behavioral theory of the firm is that 
performance is evaluated in light of organizational goals acting as reference points or 
aspiration levels (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1988; Greve, 2003). Aspiration levels 
may be formed by looking at the historical performance of an organization, and 
performance feedback is then achieved by comparing recent performance with this 
historical aspiration level. Following this notion, we built our first independent variable 
historical comparison as the difference between the performance of the publisher and 
its historical aspiration level. We use return on assets (measured as profit before tax 
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work dating back to Levinthal and March (1981), the historical aspiration level is 
constructed as follows: 
1 1 ) 1 (      t t t A P A   ,       (2) 
where A denotes the aspiration level, P is the performance measure, i.e. return 
on assets, t is a time subscript and ￿ is the weight of the historical aspiration level in the 
previous period. The weight parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the speed of goal 
adjustment and lies between zero and one. Following the procedure suggested by 
Greve (2003), we determine the appropriate value of ￿ by performing a grid search, i.e. 
we calculated firm-specific historical aspiration levels for values of ￿ between 0.01 and 
0.99 and then ran our baseline regression. The best overall model fit was obtained for a 
value of ￿ = 0.25, indicating relatively slow adjustment of aspiration levels in the 
industry (Greve, 2002). 
In contrast to historical comparison, an organization may also compare its 
performance with that of similar organizations and therefore engage in a process of 
social comparison to evaluate current performance. Our second measure of 
performance feedback, social comparison, is thus built as the difference between the 
annual performance (return on assets) of a publisher and its social aspiration level. The 
social aspiration level is calculated as the average return on assets of all other active 
firms in the same year.
1 
We further include three resource variables to study the direct and moderating 
influence of flexible and specific resources on strategic change. The first variable that 
represents a flexible resource is industry experience which measures  the flexible 
knowledge assets of a company. The intuition is that firms acquire industry-specific 
expertise that helps them compete (Levinthal, 1991; Klepper & Simons, 2000). This 
knowledge is flexible in the sense that it is not genre-specific and might help firms to 
sense and seize business opportunities across genres (Teece, 2007). Industry 
experience is constructed as the difference between the year in which the publisher 
released its first game and the focal year. 
                                                            
1  Restricting the social comparison group to closer peer groups, e.g. firms of similar size or structure gives 
qualitatively identical results. 18 
 
Our second type of flexible resource is unabsorbed slack. This measures the 
financial resources of a firm that are not committed to any particular genre or game and 
that can easily be deployed across different genres (Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986). 
Following prior studies (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010; Combs & Ketchen, 
1999) we measure unabsorbed slack using the quick ratio, the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalent divided by current liabilities.
2  
Lastly, we include the variable share of games based on IP as a measure of a 
specific resource. Intellectual property (IP) in the video game industry can be classified 
into two different categories: externally acquired intellectual property like licenses from 
books (e.g. Harry Potter), movies (e.g. Indiana Jones), sports leagues and players’ 
associations (e.g. National Football League) as well as internally developed intellectual 
property in the form of specific content (e.g. Grand Theft Auto) or software code (e.g. 
quake engine). Externally acquired licenses let the publisher build on an audience that 
is already familiar with the brand and thus substitute for its own brand-building efforts. 
Internally developed intellectual property is used to facilitate internal product 
development efforts by turning games into series. As both types of intellectual property 
are mostly tied to specific genres and capture prior resource commitments into these 
specific genres (Tschang, 2007) the variable share of games based on IP proxies for 
specific resources. Share of games based on IP is measured as the percentage share 
of newly released games drawing on external or internal intellectual property. 
Control and indicator variables. We include several control variables to 
account for factors other than performance feedback and resources that might affect 
change of product portfolios. Portfolio size measures the number of games a publisher 
introduced in a given year. As portfolio change might not only be influenced by the size 
of the portfolio but also by its composition we include the variable portfolio 
concentration, measured as the sum of squares of the share of each genre on the total 
portfolio of the publisher. To control for the influence of  publisher size on portfolio 
                                                            
2 Cash and cash equivalent is the total of all immediate negotiable media of exchange or instruments normally 
accepted by banks for deposit and immediate credit to a customer account; this item represents funds that can be 
used to pay current invoices. Current liabilities includes all short term liabilities, namely accounts payable, short-
term debt, current portion of long term debt, and other current liabilities. 19 
 
change we include firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the revenue of the 
publisher in ‘000s USD in a given year. We use the natural logarithm to account for the 
skewed revenue distribution. As publishers might change the structure of their portfolio 
when a new platform hits the market, we include a dummy platform introduction equal to 
one if a new platform is introduced. All independent and control variables are lagged by 
one year.  
 
Estimation Method 
To test our hypotheses we use a random-effects generalized least square (GLS) 
approach for linear panel regression models that have a first-order autoregressive error 
term and are unequally spaced over time (Baltagi & Wu 1999). The method is 
appropriate for several reasons. First, a test for serial correlation proposed by 
Wooldridge (2002: 176-177) revealed that the error terms are serially correlated (F = 
11.04, p<.01). As serial correlation in cross-sectional time-series models biases the 
standard errors and reduces the efficiency of the results (Drukker 2003) we control for 
AR(1) serially correlated errors in our analysis. Second, while it is possible to control for 
this type of error term in feasible generalized least square (FGLS) regression models, 
FGLS models require that the observations are equally spaced over time. However, as 
not every publisher releases new games in each year this is not the case in our data. 
Third, a robust version of the Hausman test that accounts for serial correlation across 
time and heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge 2002: 291) shows that a random effects model 
is preferred over a fixed effects model (￿
2 = 11.82, p > .1). To avoid problems of reverse 
causality all independent and control variables are lagged by one year. We ran our 
regressions using STATA 11. 
To test Hypothesis 1 we first investigated if more positive performance feedback 
in general decreases portfolio change. In a second step we wanted to see whether the 
effect is different for positive performance feedback (i.e. performance above the 
aspiration level) and negative feedback (performance below the aspiration level). To do 
so, we specified a spline function (Greene, 2008: 111-112) of the following form: 
                                                       ,     (3) 20 
 
where Yt+1 is the portfolio change at time t+1, Pt is the performance realized at time t, At 
is the aspiration level at time t, I is an indicator equal to 1 if the expression in the 
subscript is true and 0 otherwise, and Xt is a set of control variables. ￿1 is the slope of 
the feedback effect if the feedback is positive, ￿2 is the slope of the feedback if the 
performance is below the aspiration level, and ￿is the slope of the controls. Put simply, 
using a spline function allows the variables historical comparison and social comparison 
to have different slopes above and below zero. We then checked with an F-Test 
whether ￿1 equals ￿2. Hypotheses 2 and 4 are tested by including the linear values of 
industry experience and unabsorbed slack (H2) and share of games based on IP (H4), 
respectively. Hypothesis 3 is tested by interacting industry experience and unabsorbed 
slack with performance feedback. We run all our regressions using historical and social 
comparison as our two measures of performance feedback. 
 
RESULTS 
Error! Reference source not found. provides pairwise correlations and 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The correlation between our 
two measures of performance feedback, i.e. social and historical comparison, is quite 
large (r = .78) indicating that performance feedback on both dimensions tends to go in 






Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
a  
V a r i a b l e M e a n S . d . M i n M a x 123456789
1 Portfolio Change  0.48 0.35 0 2 1
2 Historical Comparison (=.25) -0.04 0.48 -5.41 1.87 -0.27* 1
3 Social Comparison -0.03 0.46 -6.05 0.90 -0.30* 0.78* 1
4 Industry Experience 12.68 6.89 0 30 -0.28* -0.02 0.12* 1
5 Unabsorbed Slack 0.85 1.15 0 9.13 -0.03 0.1 0.16* 0.13* 1
6 Share of Games based on IP 0.59 0.26 0 1 -0.29* 0.14* 0.25* 0.31* 0.15* 1
7 Portfolio Size 22.96 23.58 1 146 -0.48* -0.05 0.05 0.39* 0.01 0.20* 1
8 Portfolio Concentration 0.38 0.21 0.15 1 0.29* 0.11 -0.05 -0.32* 0.02 -0.03 -0.37* 1
9 Firm Size 12.49 2.62 4.38 18.30 -0.32* 0.04 0.20* 0.46* 0.06 0.26* 0.48* -0.28* 1
10 Platform Introduction 0.89 0.31 0 1 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0 -0.06 0.01
a n(observations)=493. 
* denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
We present the results of historical comparison on portfolio change in Error! Reference source not found. and 
replicate our analysis with social comparison as measure of performance feedback to assess the robustness of our results 





Results of Random-Effects Panel GLS Regression of Historical Comparison on Portfolio Change
a 
Variables
   Intercept  0.65*** (0.11)  0.51*** (0.11)  0.50*** (0.11)  0.52*** (0.11)  0.52*** (0.11)  0.56*** (0.11)  0.56*** (0.10)  0.58*** (0.10)
CONTROLS
   Portfolio Size -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
   Portfolio Concentration  0.25*** (0.08)  0.31*** (0.07)  0.30*** (0.07)  0.30*** (0.07)  0.30*** (0.07)  0.32*** (0.07)  0.34*** (0.07)  0.33*** (0.07)
   Firm Size -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
   Platform Introduction -0.01 (0.04)  0.00 (0.04)  0.00 (0.04)  0.00 (0.04)  0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04)  0.01 (0.04)  0.01 (0.03)
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK
   Historical Comparison -0.23*** (0.03) -0.23*** (0.03) -0.23*** (0.03) -0.22*** (0.03) -0.42*** (0.05) -0.43*** (0.05)
   Historical Comparison<0 -0.25*** (0.03)
   Historical Comparison>0 -0.20*** (0.06)
    F-Test for Equality of <0 and >0  0.43
RESOURCES
   Industry Experience  -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)
   Unabsorbed Slack -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
   Share of Games based on IP -0.18*** (0.05) -0.16*** (0.05) -0.16*** (0.05)
INTERACTION TERMS
   Historical Comparison*Industry Experience  0.02*** (0.00)  0.02*** (0.00)
   Historical Comparison*Unabsorbed Slack  0.07*** (0.02)
Overall R










Wald χ2 105.1*** 186.2*** 188.0*** 188.3*** 188.1*** 205.4*** 240.0*** 251.5***
M o d e l  1   M o d e l  2M o d e l  3M o d e l  4M o d e l  5M o d e l  6M o d e l  7M o d e l  8
a n(publishers)=69; n(observations)=493. 
b compared to Model 1. 
c compared to Model 2. 
d compared to Model 4. 
e compared to Model 5. 
f compared to Model 6. 
g compared to Model 7. 
   * p<.10 
 ** p<.05 
*** p<.01 




Results of Random-Effects Panel GLS Regression of Social Comparison on Portfolio Change
a 
Variables
   Intercept  0.65*** (0.11)  0.50*** (0.11)  0.50*** (0.11)  0.50*** (0.11)  0.51*** (0.11)  0.55*** (0.11)  0.60*** (0.10)  0.66*** (0.10)
CONTROLS
   Portfolio Size -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
   Portfolio Concentration  0.25*** (0.08)  0.25*** (0.07) 0.25*** (0.07)  0.24*** (0.07)  0.24*** (0.07) 0.27*** (0.07)  0.25*** (0.07)  0.23*** (0.07)
   Firm Size -0.01 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.00 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
   Platform Introduction -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK
   Social Comparison -0.22*** (0.03) -0.22*** (0.03) -0.22*** (0.03) -0.20*** (0.03) -0.48*** (0.05) -0.50*** (0.05)
   Social Comparison<0 -0.23*** (0.03)
   Social Comparison>0  0.07 (0.13)
    F-Test for Equality of <0 and >0  4.01**
RESOURCES
   Industry Experience  -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)
   Unabsorbed Slack -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
   Share of Games based on IP -0.18*** (0.05) -0.16*** (0.05) -0.15*** (0.05)
INTERACTION TERMS
   Social Comparison*Industry Experience  0.03*** (0.01)  0.03*** (0.01)
   Social Comparison*Unabsorbed Slack  0.12*** (0.04)
Overall R










Wald χ2 105.1*** 166.1*** 168.7*** 166.9*** 166.5*** 180.5*** 244.4*** 267.7***
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model 8 Model 6
a n(publishers)=69; n(observations)=493. 
b compared to Model 1. 
c compared to Model 2. 
d compared to Model 4. 
e compared to Model 5. 
f compared to Model 6. 
g compared to Model 7. 
   * p<.10 
 ** p<.05 
*** p<.01 
Two-tailed test for variable coefficients. 
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Several control variables are significant in all models. Portfolio size has a 
negative and significant (p<.01) impact on portfolio change, indicating that larger 
portfolios get adjusted less. Conversely, portfolio concentration has a positive and 
significant (p<.01) effect on portfolio change so that portfolios with a games 
concentrated on a few genres change more. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that negative performance feedback leads to more 
strategic change. We first discuss our results for historical comparison. In Error! 
Reference source not found. we see a consistently negative and significant (p<.01) 
influence of historical comparison on portfolio change. In column (3) we split the 
variable in performance below and above the historical aspiration level. Both the 
coefficient of performance below the historical aspiration level and the coefficient of 
performance above the historical aspiration level are negative and significant (p<.01) as 
well as similar in size, and the F-test shows no significant difference between the two. 
Results for social comparison, reported in Table 4, are identical with the exception that 
in column (3) the coefficient of performance below the social aspiration level is negative 
and significant (p<.01) while the coefficient of performance above the social aspiration 
level is not significant. Further, the difference between the two coefficients is statistically 
significant (F = 4.01, p<.05). In sum, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms with larger stocks of flexible resources engage in 
more strategic change. However, neither the coefficient of industry experience nor of 
unabsorbed slack are statistically significant in any of the models in Error! Reference 
source not found. and Error! Reference source not found.. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is 
not supported. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the relationship between performance feedback and 
portfolio change is negatively moderated by larger stocks of flexible resources. The 
interaction between historical comparison and industry experience is positive and 
significant (p<.01) in columns (7) and (8). The marginal effect of historical comparison 
for different levels of industry experience (shown in Error! Reference source not 
found.is increasing from -.43 for firms with no industry experience to .16 for firms with 
25 years of experience. The interaction effect of historical comparison and unabsorbed 25 
 
slack in column (8) is positive and significant (p<.01). The marginal effect of historical 
comparison, shown in Error! Reference source not found., is increasing in the amount of 
unabsorbed slack, but remains below zero. 
 
Figure 4 
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Marginal Effect of Historical Comparison on Portfolio Change as Unabsorbed Slack 
Changes 
 
The results of the interaction terms in the specifications with social comparison 
as measure of performance feedback shown in Error! Reference source not found. 
are qualitatively similar. The interaction between social comparison and industry 
experience is positive and significant (p<.01) in columns (7) and (8). Error! Reference 
source not found. graphs the moderating effect of industry experience on the impact of 
social comparison on portfolio change. The marginal effect of social comparison 
increases strongly from -.5 for firms with no industry experience to .29 for firms with 25 
years of industry experience. Further support for Hypothesis 3 is provided by the 
positive and significant interaction of social comparison and unabsorbed slack in model 
8. Error! Reference source not found. graphs the marginal effect of social comparison 
depending on the amount of unabsorbed slack. While the marginal effect is also 
increasing with larger amounts of unabsorbed slack it is always below zero. 

















































0 1 2 3
Unabsorbed Slack



















































0 5 10 15 20 25
Industry Experience




Marginal Effect of Social Comparison on Portfolio Change as Unabsorbed Slack 
Changes 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms with larger stocks of specific resources engage 
in less strategic change. The coefficient of the share of games based on IP is negative 
and significant (p<.01) in columns (6)-(8) in our specifications in Error! Reference 
source not found. for historical comparison and Error! Reference source not found. 
for social comparison. Hypothesis 4 is therefore strongly supported.
3 
Taken together, these results suggest that negative performance feedback, be it 
from historical or social comparison, leads to more portfolio change. While we find no 
empirical evidence for the direct influence of larger stocks of flexible resources on 
portfolio change, we find strong support for its moderating effect between performance 
feedback and portfolio change. We further find that specific resources have a direct, 
negative effect on portfolio change. 
                                                            
3 For completeness, we included the interaction term of historical and social comparison and the share of games 
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Our results confirm our basic hypothesis (Hypothesis 1): Better-performing firms 
will change their strategy less, and underachieving firms will try something new to 
change their fortunes. While this result confirms findings from prior work, it is interesting 
and novel for several reasons: First, our empirical context and the resulting dependent 
variable differ from settings studied previously: We consider an industry in which 
change happens on a regular basis and firms enter and exit genres frequently. 
Therefore, a study simply tracking the likelihood of this happening would not be useful. 
Our (continuous) measure of change takes into account both quantitative (how many 
games?) and qualitative (how novel?) aspects of strategic change in a highly dynamic 
industry. To see established findings confirmed in this setting is reassuring and 
suggests that the strategic redeployment of resources we measure indeed reacts to 
performance feedback in similar ways to discrete changes in other industries. Second, 
in the video game industry exit and bankruptcy is a common occurrence. Indeed, in our 
study period eight firms exited. Hence, an underperforming firm will have to consider 
bankruptcy a real possibility when considering different strategic options. Prior research 
has shown that this can lead to threat rigidity in firms (Audia & Greve, 2006; Miller & 
Chen, 2004) (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), leading them to stick to their core 
activities and abandon everything else, rather than engage in new, risky activities. Our 
results suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, firms below their aspiration level 
appear to react more strongly to performance feedback than firms above it, and the 
bigger the performance shortfall, the greater the change. Our results suggest that firms 
in distress still engage in change, perhaps indicating that they are taking “one last roll of 
the dice”.  
Our second hypothesis on the direct effect of flexible resources was not 
confirmed. Firms with plentiful flexible resources do not appear to spend it to engage in 
“unprovoked” strategic change. The intuition behind the hypothesis was that overhauling 
a firm’s portfolio requires unattached resources and that firms with such resources will 
spend them to initiate strategic change. If strategic change led to better firm 30 
 
performance, this might lead to path-dependencies: firms accumulate flexible resources 
because they perform well, and they can use these resources to extend their lead. 
Financially constrained firms will find it difficult to catch up. However, Error! Reference 
source not found. shows that more change does not lead to significantly higher (or 
lower) performance. In combination with the finding that Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed 
we conjecture that constraints in flexible resources are not a key limiting factor of 
performance-enhancing strategic change.  
Hypothesis 3 refers to the moderating influence of flexible resources on the effect 
of performance feedback on strategic change. Our regressions confirm this hypothesis: 
Firms with large amounts of flexible resources react less strongly to performance 
feedback. That Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed implies resource constraints do not 
reduce firms’ propensity to change across the board. By contrast, the significant (and 
positive) interaction term suggests an interesting intuition: In periods of low 
performance, firms without a sizable financial “war chest” and with comparatively low 
industry experience may feel pressured into taking risks and initiating strategic change – 
without a clear expectation of increased performance as shown by Error! Reference 
source not found.. Conversely, firms with flexible resources can afford to act largely 
independent of short-term (negative) performance feedback. Note that flexible 
resources could be used for any activity unlike specific ones that will bias a firm towards 
stability. Still, it appears that such flexible resources will not be used for short-term 
strategic changes, which again suggests that in an industry in which bankruptcy is a real 
danger being shielded from short-term pressures to act is a luxury afforded by sufficient 
financial resources and industry experience.  
Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed by our empirics. A high proportion of specific 
resources in the form of externally acquired or internally developed intellectual property 
renders firms less prone to strategic change across the board, i.e. independent of 
performance feedback. This is intuitive as abandoning games or genres in which 
specific investments have been made would entail high costs of reentering them. This 
effect holds across all levels of performance feedback. Hence, it appears that specific 
assets in the form of intellectual property have an option value to the firm: Regardless of 
their current contribution to performance specific resources are retained by the firm in 31 
 
anticipation that they might generate value in the future. This poses an interesting 
managerial question: Does investing in specific assets pay off even if the market is 
highly volatile as suggested by Dezsö et al. (2010)? Our results indicate that firms seem 
to think so given they continue to use those assets even if current performance is below 
par and they do not abandon them if performance is high which could trigger a period of 
strategic experimentation.  
Our results on different resource types point in different directions: First, flexible 
resources have no discernible impact on a firm’s overall inclination to strategic change, 
but they make firms less reactive to performance feedback. That is, flexible resources 
afford firms the flexibility to navigate through turbulent times without having to change 
course frequently and perhaps inefficiently. This suggests that resources afford firms 
stability rather than flexibility. We offer two explanations for this: First, firms might be 
able – they have the resources – but not willing to act on negative performance 
feedback. This is supported by the observation that firms engaging in more change do 
not perform better on average. In other words, external pressure from investors and the 
threat of bankruptcy may drive firms to initiate change for change’s sake in situations 
where a steady hand may offer more promising long-term returns. A second, related 
explanation may be that firms with flexible resources simply do not believe that they 
need to change. This suggests that stability is not an explicit strategy to weather periods 
of low performance, but a failure to interpret signals from the market as valid feedback. 
Organizational inertia may result from superior past performance, which in turn may 
have led to large amounts of disposable cash (and therefore high unabsorbed slack) or 
survival (and therefore high industry experience). This reading relies on firms’ 
confidence in their own capabilities and judgment, and future research should aim at 
distinguishing between the two explanations outlined above. 
Conversely, specific resources reduce a firm’s flexibility overall, not just in 
periods of sub-par performance. This is likely down to the lock-in effect of specific 
resources (Ghemawat, 1991; Dixit, 1989). The intuition is as follows: As any activity in a 
particular genre requires resources to build up complementary expertise and reputation, 
a genre in which some of these investments have already been made through the 
acquisition of external intellectual property (substituting to some extent for the game 32 
 
publisher’s own brand-building efforts) or the development of own internal intellectual 
property, the marginal return of continuing to invest in these genres is higher than for 
new genres, which reinforces specialization into these genres. The strategic 
redeployment of resources is thus determined by the marginal returns of the invested 
resources, which in turn depends on the prior investments made. We thus expect this 
tendency to persist over time, especially given the lack of clear performance 
implications of strategic change.  
More broadly, our research contributes to three distinct research streams. First, 
we extend the resource-based view of strategy by highlighting the role of performance 
feedback for resource deployment. A central tenet of the resource-based view is the 
path-dependency of firm strategies, i.e. the existing stock of strategic resources 
channels and constrains future firm behavior. Our results support this conjecture for 
strategic, specialized resources. However, we also find that flexible resources 
strengthen the path dependency of strategic behavior in the sense that strategic choices 
once taken are not abandoned in response to short-term performance shortfalls. We 
cannot resolve empirically whether flexible resources confer stability advantages or 
reinforce organizational inertia based on our findings, but intend to resolve this in future 
work.  
Second, and related, our research speaks to the challenges of strategy-making in 
volatile business environments. Following Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), successful 
firms in such settings engage in proactive, time-paced evolution. They create temporal 
links in project portfolios and “get from the present to the future through choreographed 
steps” (Brown and Eisenhardt (1997: 29). In our study, it appears that time paced 
evolution requires a certain level of stability to preserve the intended choreography in 
the product portfolio. Unabsorbed slack resources provide stability and enable an 
organization to hold on to a previously chosen choreography. Industry experience helps 
to interpret immediate performance feedback and to decide when to hold on to a 
choreographed portfolio – and when to abandon it in favor of a new one. In contrast, 
event-paced evolution is primarily focused on the present, with firms reacting to current 
events. Performance feedback are events that firms may respond to and responding to 
them may result in excessive change. Thus, the flexible resources of a firm may confer 33 
 
stability advantages by enabling and supporting time paced evolution in volatile 
markets.  
Third, we add to the growing body of literature that highlights the moderating 
factors for organizational risk taking (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Audia & Greve, 2003). Our 
findings point to the organizational resource base as an important moderator of 
performance feedback in volatile markets. An open issue is whether the hypothesized 
relationship – larger stocks of flexible resources make organizational risk-taking less 
sensitive to performance feedback – also holds in more stable environments. Based on 
the theoretical arguments developed above, we would assume performance feedback 
to be more consequential for organizational adaptation in such settings (Greve, 2003; 
March, 2010). This would diminish the stability advantages afforded by unabsorbed 
slack resources and industry expertise in more volatile settings. Thus, flexible resources 
should continue to moderate the link between performance feedback and risk-taking, 
yet make firms more sensitive to performance feedback. By contrast, specific resources 
are also expected to stabilize the strategic behavior of firms in stable settings. Based on 




We study a volatile setting in which strategic change, firm exit and performance 
fluctuations are common. Starting from the theories of aspiration levels and 
organizational change under uncertainty, we propose that the composition of a firm’s 
resource base affects firm reactions to performance feedback. Contrary to prior findings, 
we find firms with a large stock of flexible (unspecialized) assets to react less to 
performance feedback, suggesting that it is not a lack of resources forcing firms to stay 
put in turbulent times. Instead, it appears that stability in the face of turbulence is a 
“luxury” that only well-resourced firms can afford, or that firms with a large resource 
base simply disregard signals about their performance and carry on with a longer-term 
strategy instead. Future research should look at the performance implications of these 
different reactions to performance feedback to distinguish between these explanations. 34 
 
Our study has several limitations. First, our sample is biased towards comparably 
large firms that publish their financial data. These firms constitute a large part of the 
industry, however, and are subject to market fluctuations in the same way as smaller 
ones. Still, it would be interesting to study strategic decision-making in smaller firms to 
see if a higher risk of bankruptcy would change decisions as suggested by prior work. 
Second, we have no direct information on the decision-making process and proxy 
strategic change by observable portfolio changes. However, since structuring the 
product portfolio is the key strategic decision firms make in the industry, we think that 
we capture the outcome of the decision process well. Third, our measures of firm 
resources are imperfect. While we tried to rule out competing explanations by 
controlling for other potentially interfering variables and interpreting both linear and 
moderating effects, finding more accurate measures of firm resources is a line of future 
research.  
We believe that our results are relevant both to scholars of aspiration levels and 
to scholars of the resource-based view of the firm. Both approaches would benefit from 
incorporating the other perspective in their hypotheses and tests. Even more 
interestingly, a firm’s resource base (both in size and composition) and its performance 
relative to its goals interact in nontrivial ways. We thus hope that this is the first step in a 
series of studies in which the generalizability of our results to other contexts, industries 
and strategies will be tested.   35 
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Appendix A: Numerical Example of the Dependent Variable 
To better understand the construction of our dependent variable, consider the 
following fictitious example of a publisher whose portfolios of the years 2000-2006 
are given in Table A1. For simplification, we use only four genres in our example 
instead of the eight genres used in our analysis. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------- 
If we assume that the publisher is founded in the year 2000 we cannot 
calculate a change measure for this year so that 2001 is our starting point. As the 
publisher does not change its portfolio in 2001 compared to 2000, portfolio change 
takes a value of 0. In 2002, the publisher releases four new action games and four 
new role-playing games (RPG). We first have to subtract the four games in each 
category from the two games in each of the genres in 2001 yielding to a difference of 
2 in each genre. We then sum the differences, so that we end up with 4. This is the 
number of all changes in all genres. We then divide this term by 12 which is the sum 
of all games launched in 2001 and 2002 or put differently the number of all possible 
changes. This leads to a value of 0.3 for the first term of our formula, which we then 
multiply with the weight. As the publisher does not enter a new genre the weight 
takes a value of 1, leading to an overall value of 0.3 for portfolio change.  
In 2003 the publisher cut in half its releases in every active genre. Because he 
does exactly the opposite of what he does in the year before where he doubles his 
positions in every active genre the portfolio change measures again takes a value of 
0.3.  
In 2004 the publisher doubles the number of new games in active genres and 
enters the sports genre with two games. This increases both the first and the second 
term of our measure. The left side (the first term) is the result of six actual changes in 
all genres divided by fourteen possible changes. Because the publisher enters a new 
genre the weight takes a value of 1 plus 0.3 that is one new genre divided by three 
active genres. Multiplying the two numbers we get an overall value of 0.57 for 43 
 
portfolio change, which is above the 2002 value where the publisher doubles the 
number of games but does not enter a new genre.  
In 2005 the publisher again cut in half the number of new games in the action 
and RPG genres but he also leaves the sports genre. This leads to an overall value 
of the variable of 0.43. This value is above the 2003 value when the publisher also 
halves the size of its portfolio but does not leave a genre, but below the 2004 value 
when the publisher doubles its portfolio and enters a new genre. Hence, we see that 
our measure takes higher values if a publisher enters a new genre compared to 
situations where he abandons one. This is in line with the consideration that starting 
something new bears more risk than ending something. 
In 2006 the publisher completely changes the structure of his portfolio. He 
leaves the action and RPG genres and enters the sports and strategy genres with 
two games respectively. Here, there are eight actual changes across all genres 
divided by eight possible changes giving 1 for the first term. The weight takes a value 
of 2 (two new genre/two active genres + 1) so that portfolio change takes a value of 
2, the highest value of our measure. Indeed, a complete portfolio overhaul occurs 6 
times in our sample. 
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  Action RPG  Sport  Strateg
y 




nt,new n t portfolio  change 
2000  2 2 0 0  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
2001  2 2 0 0  0  8 0 2  0 
2002  4 4 0 0  4  12  0 2  0.3   
2003  2 2 0 0  4  12  0 2  0.3   
2004  4 4 2 0  6  14  1 3  0.57 
2005  2 2 0 0  6  14  0 2  0.43 
2006  0 0 2 2  8  8 2 2  2 